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The assessment of options and trade-offs in an integrative portfolio-management structure suitable to Chief of Naval Operations CNO -level review. Because issues arise at different levels e. The relationships among levels of analysis cannot merely be asserted on the basis of implicit assumptions; instead, they must be derived from thoughtful, explicit analysis with conscious trade-offs. In domains in which one seeks flexible, adaptive, and robust capabilities, effective solutions typically depend on developing appropriate capabilities as.

These exist in the realm of systems and platforms, organization, and operations. Planning for the future in an uncertain era of dynamic change implies rethinking—and probably transforming—the building blocks. For the Navy, this will likely mean new strike groups, different concepts of manning, and new joint operations or ways of conducting old ones.

Finally, conducting CBP well will require first-class analysis. Achieving this objective involves institutional issues and has major implications for staffing, organization, and reward systems. Does the Department of the Navy have a sound, top-level conceptual framework to guide capabilities-based planning? Moore, Jr.

Harms, Jr. Totushek, USN. Naval Institute Proceedings, June. The committee concludes that the Department of the Navy has done a creditable job in laying out a broad strategic approach and has gone on to delineate sensibly the special responsibilities that the maritime Services have in national strategy and joint operations. Were the planning to stop with this top level, it would produce little more than good viewgraphs, but the Navy has put considerable effort into assuring that all of the important functions of the department are mapped into this structure and that useful decompositions exist down to meaningful levels of detail see the next subsection.

Such breakdowns are always imperfect because of crosscutting factors, but the committee was satisfied that the structure largely makes sense. The structure will probably change over time as the Navy gains experience with the decomposition and makes adjustments, but the approach is sensible. The mapping issue is nontrivial because the Navy capabilities, natural in an operations-oriented decomposition, depend on a number of the functional capabilities in JCIDS.

The committee is also convinced that at the highest levels of the Navy and the Marine Corps there is a commitment to jointness—not merely to offer lip service to it but because jointness is a fundamental aspect of overall transformation for the new era in which the United States finds itself.

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At that highest level, as reflected in the core documents, it is appreciated that warfighting will almost always need to be joint in the future. Even under those circumstances, however, enormous responsibilities will continue to devolve upon the maritime commanders. Finally, the higher-level documents all reflect a commitment to flexibility, adaptiveness, and robustness. This is perhaps not surprising, since the Navy and Marine Corps have traditionally emphasized these qualities to a greater extent than have the Army and Air Force, which became more captive to planning for particular war scenarios.


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The committee was generally impressed by the presentations made by representatives of naval organizations two levels down from the highest level. Here the committee saw evidence of managerial rethinking about organization, process, and products to support CBP. For example, in the briefings cited, the committee saw reference not only to analytical work on capabilities, but also to life-cycle costs, and business-case assumptions.

The Navy has even reorganized to operate what it calls a Virtual Systems Command to increase agility and integration. It also suggested determination not only to identify overlapping capabilities but to distinguish between desirable and undesirable redundancy and to identify both capability gaps and trade-offs. At least in a quick-look review, this class of work appeared to be professional and responsive to the new paradigms of CBP.

Whether the Virtual Systems Command will work out is, of course, something that only experience will show.


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The committee also heard a briefing from the Navy Warfare Development Command NWDC , 9 which addressed rather extensive fleet-based experimentation to support near-term assessments closely related to filling recognized capability gaps e. This effort reflected a laudable Navy decision to reemphasize fleet-level experimentation and the accumulation of substantial empirical and analytical data.

The experiments described, however, were all focused on the near term. Although all of them were clearly desirable and important, the committee was concerned that the effort might remain too exclusively concerned with near-term, incremental issues. The Navy leadership will wish to review issues of balance over time. In contrast to the experience described above, the committee found many reasons for concern at the level between top-level guidance and systems command SYSCOM -level work. Here the committee observed severe disconnects between top-level intentions and reality in the ranks.

When the committee asked about excursions and exploratory analysis around baseline assumptions, briefers reported that there had been very little done. Thus, while some viewgraphs had been changed to be consistent with CBP, much of the ongoing work still had the problems of the previous era, particularly those surrounding point-scenario analysis. Although the problems seen by the committee may have been temporary, they appeared more likely to be chronic.

If so, the Navy should recognize these as being systematic, indicating deep-seated issues, and act accordingly. Corrective measures will take much more than top-level documents, because staff take their lead from a myriad of actions and priorities expressed in the course of time. These problems are discussed more fully in the next section. It is always a matter of judgment how far to carry such breakdowns. As one goes into more detail, issues and tasks become increasingly well defined and challenges become more explicit.

However, excessive decomposition also generates a morass of detail that is not useful for higher-level planning. In capabilities-based planning, it is desirable to stop decomposing before that happens or, at least, to carry along alternative decompositions reflecting alternative concepts of operation.

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As can be seen from Figure 3. Detailed decomposition is, however, valuable for defining the myriad detailed tasks that must be mastered, supported, and coordinated. All Services are required to prepare detailed decomposition, and the results are published as the Unified Joint Task List by the Joint Staff. If the mission to engage moving land targets had been left implicit, it might not receive adequate attention.

By and large, the committee concludes that the decomposition shown in Figure 3. In particular, it has enough detail so that responsibilities for follow-up work can be assigned meaningfully. And, although there are scores of capability areas indicated counting at the lowest level , the number is small enough to be managed.

What matters, of course, is that for each one of these capability areas, the Department of the Navy does in-depth analysis to assess needs, capabilities, and improvement options. The committee could hardly review or assess that effort in a cursory review. However, Figure 3. In contrast, much better progress is projected for countering minefields by what mechanism was not made clear to the committee.

The assessments were the result of subjective warfighter estimates, informed also by results of POM campaign analyses and mission-level analyses. The process used to obtain the estimates was neither rigorous nor satisfactory to participants, but it was a systematic first effort that can be refined with time.

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The analytical approach being employed, then, appears to be that of using the decompositions, examining needs and capabilities in each area, and projecting changes over time in high-level depictions. That approach is reasonable, and was also consistent with the need in CBP to go to mission level rather than merely reporting results of theater-level campaigns in particular scenarios.

The committee was surprised by the results shown in Figure 3. So far, so good. OPNAV will wish to review the situation when this report emerges, but the generic problems are as follows:. Trivializing uncertainty issues by examining a variety of name-level or specific scenarios e. For the purposes of CBP, there are often more important variations across cases within a given name-level scenario than across name-level scenarios.

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Trivializing exploratory analysis , which is a core element of CBP, by conducting only a few excursions with one or a few assumptions changed typically in organizationally comfortable ways , while other assumptions are held constant as though certain. Relying upon large, complex, and inflexible models and databases , which often bury issues and preclude exploration. The Department of the Navy analysis of a scenario of a major war of a traditional sort briefed to the committee at its July workshop reflected serious problems in each of the categories listed above.

There was very little discussion or appreciation of uncertainty, except sometimes in boilerplate slides. Worse, this vacuum seemed to be regarded by the analytic staff as the norm. Indeed, it was claimed that there was insufficient time to do many excursions. The committee finds this trivializing of uncertainty issues quite troubling and inconsistent with fundamental tenets of capabilities-based planning.


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